美国《新闻周刊》12月8日文章，原题：为哪些中国不要再统治世界大多数学者认为大衰退对中国的助益多于任何否则 国家。英国资深记者马丁?雅克已在预测，中国不久将统治世界。否则，在敲定中国世纪到来如果，不妨看一看过去一年来中国实际所处于的。（相关链接：容易：《当中国统治世界》快出中文版了 ）
中国官员突然表现得诚惶诚恐，这当中可能性有夸大成分。或许亲戚亲戚我们我们我们 都如果谦虚或为了平息西方对所谓中国威胁的担忧。否则，更有可能性的是中国领导人确实是在告知实情。亲戚亲戚我们我们我们 都知道另一方的国家确实已赢得了引人注目的复苏。但亲戚亲戚我们我们我们 都同样明白，这名成如果相对而言的———中国为此付出了巨大的长期代价。除了为未来埋下不良贷款的隐患，投资主导型刺激政策催生了新的产能，但未能真正激活死气沉沉的居民消费，从而加剧了经济失衡。
曾经谜：可能性中国好难 强大，为哪些它好难 在防止全球问题图片图片上充当更多的领导角色？中国官员出现在几乎所有重要世界会议上，其观点和获得的支持也颇受关注，但亲戚亲戚我们我们我们 都始终保持低调，只专注于捍卫本国国家利益，忽略了可借以展示软实力的可能性。之类，在G20峰会上，中国唯一关心的是不要再香港被列入受监管避税天堂名单。中国曾呼吁建立新的国际储备货币，除此之外对如可改革全球金融体系基本不敲定。对于无力将力量转化为国际舞台上的实际利益的问题图片图片，多数中国领导人似乎如果太关心，可能性亲戚亲戚我们我们我们 全是更为操心的国内问题图片图片。
很多哪些全是 有利于解释，为哪些中国人或许为逃脱世界经济危机的最糟糕后果而如释重负，但亲戚亲戚我们我们我们 全是确实要为此喜讯为啥写。诚然，危机让中国缩小了与对手（尤其是美日）之间的经济差距。大众对中国全新力量的肯定让中国领导人沐浴在全球聚光灯下，并可向国内公众炫耀中国国际地位提升。但中国领导人并不糊涂，亲戚亲戚我们我们我们 都十分清楚所面临的挑战有多严峻，也十分清楚时运可能性说变就变。
当然，中国人乐见人人夸亲戚亲戚我们我们我们 全是最大赢家。但事实上，亲戚亲戚我们我们我们 都更像是损失最小的输家———中国人对此心知肚明。▲（作者裴敏欣，汪析译）
Why China Won\'t Rule the World
By Minxin Pei | NEWSWEEK
Published Dec 8, 4009
From the magazine issue dated Dec 7, 4009
Conventional wisdom can be devilishly hard to dispute. For example, most pundits agree that the Great Recession helped China more than any other state. At first glance, this claim seems obviously true. Unlike the United States and the other major Western powers, which saw their economies plummet and their financial institutions come close to ruin, the Chinese economy has kept on growing. Chinese financial institutions, considered technically insolvent only a few years ago, now boast balance sheets and market capitalizations that Western banks can only dream of. With its economy expected to grow at 9 percent in 2010, China will soon surpass Japan as the world\'s second-largest economy (measured in U.S. dollars). Pundits like Martin Jacques, a veteran British journalist, are predicting that China will soon rule the world—figuratively, if not literally.
Yet before declaring this the Chinese century, you might want to take another look at what\'s actually taken place in the country over the past year.
Its leaders\' frequently voiced trepidation may be overstated. Perhaps the officials are simply being modest or trying to soothe Western worries about the so-called China Threat. It\'s far more likely, however, that China\'s leaders are actually telling the truth. They know their country has indeed pulled off the world\'s most impressive recovery. But they also know that\'s a relative -accomplishment—and China has paid a huge long-term price in the process. In addition to sowing the seeds for future dud loans, its investment-focused stimulus policies have exacerbated the country\'s economic imbalances by creating new productive -capacities—factories and the like—without really boosting China\'s anemic household consumption. In other words, Chinese plants may be cranking out even more TVs, cars, and toys than before, but no Chinese are buying them. Loosened bank credit has mainly benefited SOEs, allowing these inefficient behemoths to expand at the expense of the private sector, which has been given little access to the government\'s largess.One of the strangest things about predictions of Chinese dominance is that they tend to impress everyone but the Chinese themselves. Take China\'s supposedly miraculous economic recovery. While the international business community has practically run out of words to praise Beijing\'s handling of the crisis, Chinese leaders haven\'t stopped worrying. They fret that their banks have gone on a reckless lending binge; Liu Mingkang, China\'s chief bank regulator, warned in September that \"all sorts of risks have risen\" as a result. He\'s right. In the first half of 4009, Chinese banks shelled out roughly $1.2 trillion, creating a potential tidal wave of future nonperforming loans. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) used much of the money to speculate in the real-estate and stock markets and to make questionable expansions; as a result, Dragonomics, a Beijing-based consultancy, now estimates that as much as one sixth of all the bank loans made between 4008 and 2010 could end up not paying off. Yet Beijing is still wary of shutting off the spigot, lest China prove unable to keep growing without it.
Meanwhile, China has yet to confront what has become an enormous overcapacity for producing cheap goods. During the boom, when Americans were hungry for these products, Chinese exports registered double-digit growth year after year, accounting for nearly a quarter of the country\'s net GDP growth. Now that nervous and debt-ridden U.S. consumers have virtually shut their pocketbooks, China can no longer expect them to snap up its wares. To account for this change, Beijing must embark on some painful restructuring, shuttering many export--oriented factories and strengthening the social safety net to boost household consumption (which remains stuck below 40 percent of GDP).(点击此处阅读下一页)